asians图影城 the asian the asian financial crisis of 10 years ago taught two contrasting lessons: financial crisis of 10 years ago taught two contrasting lessons: the one the majority of western economists thought the asians the one the majority of western economists thought the asians should learn; and the one asians did learn. should learn; and the one asians did learn. 十年前的亚洲金融危机留下了两个对比鲜明的教训：一个是大多数西方经济学家认为亚洲人应学到的教训；另一个是亚洲人实际学到的教训。 shi nian qian de ya zhou jin rong wei ji liu xia le liang ge dui bi xian ming de jiao xun yi ge shi da duo shu xi fang jing ji xue jia ren wei ya zhou ren ying xue dao de jiao xun ling yi ge shi ya zhou ren shi ji xue dao de jiao xun the western economists concluded that emerging economies should the western economists concluded that emerging economies should adopt flexible exchange rates and modern, well-regulated and adopt flexible exchange rates and modern, well-regulated and competitive financial markets. the asians decided to choose competitive financial markets. the asians decided to choose competitive exchange rates, export-led growth and huge competitive exchange rates, export-led growth and huge accumulations of foreign currency reserves. the question is whether accumulations of foreign currency reserves. the question is whether the asians need to change their choice. the answer, i believe, is the asians need to change their choice. the answer, i believe, is "yes". "yes". 西方经济学家得出的结论是，新兴经济体应采取灵活的汇率制度，并建立现代的、监管良好的、有竞争力的金融市场。而亚洲人则决定选择有竞争力的汇率、出口导向型增长模式和大规模积累外汇储备。问题是亚洲人是否需要改变自己的选择。我认为，答案是肯定的。 xi fang jing ji xue jia de chu de jie lun shi xin xing jing ji ti ying cai qu ling huo de hui lv zhi du bing jian li xian dai de jian guan liang hao de you jing zheng li de jin rong shi chang er ya zhou ren ze jue ding xuan ze you jing zheng li de hui lv chu kou dao xiang xing zeng chang mo shi he da gui mo ji lei wai hui chu bei wen ti shi ya zhou ren shi fou xu yao gai bian zi ji de xuan ze wo ren wei da an shi ken ding de when downward pressure on the thai baht started 10 years ago, when downward pressure on the thai baht started 10 years ago, nobody expected what followed - its devaluation in early july. that nobody expected what followed - its devaluation in early july. that seemingly small event generated a financial tsunami that engulfed seemingly small event generated a financial tsunami that engulfed most of east asia and overwhelmed indonesia, malaysia, the most of east asia and overwhelmed indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, south korea and thailand. exchange rates collapsed, philippines, south korea and thailand. exchange rates collapsed, financial systems went bankrupt, governments teetered on the edge financial systems went bankrupt, governments teetered on the edge of default and economies succumbed to deep recessions. officials of default and economies succumbed to deep recessions. officials from the international monetary fund raced from one crisis-hit from the international monetary fund raced from one crisis-hit country to the next. in its last movements, the crisis went global, country to the next. in its last movements, the crisis went global, overwhelming russia in august 1998 and brazil in early 1999. overwhelming russia in august 1998 and brazil in early 1999. 10年前，当泰铢出现的下行压力时，没人预料到接下来发生的事——7月初它开始贬值。这件看似很小的事件导致了一场金融“海啸”，“吞没”了东亚的大部分地区，席卷了印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、韩国和泰国。其结果是汇率制度瓦解，金融体系崩溃，政府在信用违约的边缘摇摇欲坠，经济纷纷陷入深度衰退。国际货币基金组织(imf)的官员们奔走于各个遭遇危机重击的国家之间。最终，这场危机波及到全球各地，1998年8月席卷了俄罗斯，1999年初又殃及巴西。 10 nian qian dang tai zhu chu xian de xia hang ya li shi mei ren yu liao dao jie xia lai fa sheng de shi 7 yue chu ta kai shi bian zhi zhe jian kan si hen xiao de shi jian dao zhi le yi chang jin rong hai xiao tun mei le dong ya de da bu fen di qu xi juan le yin du ni xi ya ma lai xi ya fei lv bin han guo he tai guo qi jie guo shi hui lv zhi du wa jie jin rong ti xi beng kui zheng fu zai xin yong wei yue de bian yuan yao yao yu zhui jing ji fen fen xian ru shen du shuai tui guo ji huo bi ji jin zu zhi (imf) de guan yuan men ben zou yu ge ge zao yu wei ji zhong ji de guo jia zhi jian zui zhong zhe chang wei ji bo ji dao quan qiu ge di 1998 nian 8 yue xi juan le e luo si 1999 nian chu you yang ji ba xi as surprising as the onset of the asian crisis has been its as surprising as the onset of the asian crisis has been its aftermath. with the important, but geographically limited, aftermath. with the important, but geographically limited, exceptions of argentina and turkey in 2001, the crises of 1997-98 exceptions of argentina and turkey in 2001, the crises of 1997-98 have so far been the last in the long series of financial crises have so far been the last in the long series of financial crises that afflicted emerging economies in the 1980s and 1990s. today, that afflicted emerging economies in the 1980s and 1990s. today, the desire of outside investors to put their money in these the desire of outside investors to put their money in these economies is overwhelming, as is shown in the strength of their economies is overwhelming, as is shown in the strength of their financial markets, the low spreads on external borrowing and the financial markets, the low spreads on external borrowing and the size of the private capital inflow: in 2006, for example, net size of the private capital inflow: in 2006, for example, net private capital flow to emerging economies was $256bn. the imf is private capital flow to emerging economies was $256bn. the imf is now almost entirely out of business. now almost entirely out of business. 与它的爆发一样，此次亚洲金融危机的结果也非常出人意料。从它的严重程度和地理局限性上讲，1997至1998年的危机成为上世纪80、90年代折磨新兴经济体的一连串金融危机中的最后一次（除了2001年的阿根廷和土耳其危机）。如今，外部投资者将资金投入这些经济体的欲望十分强烈，证据包括走势强劲的金融市场、较低的外部借款息差和规模庞大的私人资本流入——例如，2006年，新兴经济体的私人资本净流入达到2560亿美元。现在，国际货币基金组织几乎无事可做了。 yu ta de bao fa yi yang ci ci ya zhou jin rong wei ji de jie guo ye fei chang chu ren yi liao cong ta de yan zhong cheng du he di li ju xian xing shang jiang 1997 zhi 1998 nian de wei ji cheng wei shang shi ji 80 90 nian dai zhe mo xin xing jing ji ti de yi lian chuan jin rong wei ji zhong de zui hou yi ci chu le 2001 nian de a gen ting he tu er qi wei ji ru jin wai bu tou zi zhe jiang zi jin tou ru zhe xie jing ji ti de yu wang shi fen qiang lie zheng ju bao kuo zou shi qiang jin de jin rong shi chang jiao di de wai bu jie kuan xi cha he gui mo pang da de si ren zi ben liu ru li ru 2006 nian xin xing jing ji ti de si ren zi ben jing liu ru da dao 2560 yi mei yuan xian zai guo ji huo bi ji jin zu zhi ji hu wu shi ke zuo le what explains this new stability? as nouriel roubini of new york what explains this new stability? as nouriel roubini of new york university's stern school of business argues, the asians did not university's stern school of business argues, the asians did not learn the lessons most western economists thought they should.* learn the lessons most western economists thought they should.* this is not to deny that there have been substantial structural this is not to deny that there have been substantial structural improvements in asian economies, notably in the capitalisation and improvements in asian economies, notably in the capitalisation and regulation of financial systems. but this is not the heart of the regulation of financial systems. but this is not the heart of the matter. the big event has been elsewhere: the great mistake, asian matter. the big event has been elsewhere: the great mistake, asian policymakers concluded, was not pegged, but overvalued, exchange policymakers concluded, was not pegged, but overvalued, exchange rates. that error was what had brought the humiliating dictation by rates. that error was what had brought the humiliating dictation by imf officials operating under the thumb of the us treasury. imf officials operating under the thumb of the us treasury. 如何解释这种新的稳定性？正如纽约大学斯特恩商学院(new york ru he jie shi zhe zhong xin de wen ding xing zheng ru niu yue da xue si te en shang xue yuan (new york university's stern school of business)的鲁里埃尔"鲁比尼(nouriel university's stern school of business) de lu li ai er " lu bi ni (nouriel roubini)所言，亚洲人没有学到多数西方经济学家认为他们应该学到的教训。这并不是否认亚洲经济体已经出现实质性的结构改善，尤其在金融体系的资本化和监管方面。但这不是问题的核心。重要问题是在其它方面：亚洲决策者经过总结认为，重大错误不是盯住汇率制，而是汇率高估。正是这个错误，才使听命于美国财政部的国际货币基金组织官员到亚洲来指手划脚。 roubini) suo yan ya zhou ren mei you xue dao duo shu xi fang jing ji xue jia ren wei ta men ying gai xue dao de jiao xun zhe bing bu shi fou ren ya zhou jing ji ti yi jing chu xian shi zhi xing de jie gou gai shan you qi zai jin rong ti xi de zi ben hua he jian guan fang mian dan zhe bu shi wen ti de he xin zhong yao wen ti shi zai qi ta fang mian ya zhou jue ce zhe jing guo zong jie ren wei zhong da cuo wu bu shi ding zhu hui lv zhi er shi hui lv gao gu zheng shi zhe ge cuo wu cai shi ting ming yu mei guo cai zheng bu de guo ji huo bi ji jin zu zhi guan yuan dao ya zhou lai zhi shou hua jiao "never again" became the watchword. never again has been the "never again" became the watchword. never again has been the result. now the east asian emerging economies are mostly creditor result. now the east asian emerging economies are mostly creditor nations. moreover, much of their accumulation of external assets is nations. moreover, much of their accumulation of external assets is in official hands (see chart). by february of this year, the in official hands (see chart). by february of this year, the foreign currency reserves of east and south asian countries had foreign currency reserves of east and south asian countries had reached $3,280bn, up by $2,490bn since the beginning of 1999. reached $3,280bn, up by $2,490bn since the beginning of 1999. china's reserves alone reached $1,160bn, up by $1,010bn over the china's reserves alone reached $1,160bn, up by $1,010bn over the same period. while a substantial accumulation of reserves seemed a same period. while a substantial accumulation of reserves seemed a justified (if expensive) form of insurance in the aftermath of the justified (if expensive) form of insurance in the aftermath of the crisis, today's levels look excessive. in most east asian economies crisis, today's levels look excessive. in most east asian economies the ratio of reserves to short-term foreign currency debt is four the ratio of reserves to short-term foreign currency debt is four or five to one. or five to one. “下不为例”成了口号。结果便是再也没有下一次。现在，东亚的新兴经济体大多成为债权国。此外，它们积累的大部分外部资产都集中在官方手里（见表）。截至今年2月，东南亚国家的外汇储备总量已经达到3.28万亿美元，较1999年初增加了2.49万亿美元。单就中国而言，其同期储备额就增加了1.01万亿美元，达到1.16万亿美元。虽然在危机之后大量积累外汇储备似乎是个合理的保障方式（尽管有些代价高昂），但如今的水平看来过高了。在大多数东亚经济体中，外汇储备与短期外债的比例为4比1或5比1。 asians图影城 xia bu wei li cheng le kou hao jie guo bian shi zai ye mei you xia yi ci xian zai dong ya de xin xing jing ji ti da duo cheng wei zhai quan guo ci wai ta men ji lei de da bu fen wai bu zi chan dou ji zhong zai guan fang shou li jian biao jie zhi jin nian 2 yue dong nan ya guo jia de wai hui chu bei zong liang yi jing da dao 3.28 wan yi mei yuan jiao 1999 nian chu zeng jia le 2.49 wan yi mei yuan dan jiu zhong guo er yan qi tong qi chu bei e jiu zeng jia le 1.01 wan yi mei yuan da dao 1.16 wan yi mei yuan sui ran zai wei ji zhi hou da liang ji lei wai hui chu bei si hu shi ge he li de bao zhang fang shi jin guan you xie dai jia gao ang dan ru jin de shui ping kan lai guo gao le zai da duo shu dong ya jing ji ti zhong wai hui chu bei yu duan qi wai zhai de bi li wei 4 bi 1 huo 5 bi 1 asians tu ying cheng the scale of the reserve accumulation demonstrates the obvious: the scale of the reserve accumulation demonstrates the obvious: these countries have refused to adopt the freely floating exchange these countries have refused to adopt the freely floating exchange rates many outside economists recommended. they have, instead, rates many outside economists recommended. they have, instead, chosen to keep their exchange rates down. this, in turn, has chosen to keep their exchange rates down. this, in turn, has generated current account surpluses. sustaining such surpluses generated current account surpluses. sustaining such surpluses requires a stable excess of savings over domestic investment. one requires a stable excess of savings over domestic investment. one instrument they have used has been sterilisation of the monetary instrument they have used has been sterilisation of the monetary consequences of reserve accumulations, to prevent the normal consequences of reserve accumulations, to prevent the normal expansion of money and credit, overheating, inflation and so loss expansion of money and credit, overheating, inflation and so loss of external competitiveness. of external competitiveness. 外汇储备的规模表明了一个显而易见的事实：这些国家拒绝实行许多外部经济学家建议的自由浮动汇率制度。它们反而选择压低本国汇率。这继而导致了经常账户盈余。保持这种盈余需要本国储蓄持续高于国内投资。这些国家采用的手段就是“冲销”外汇储备累积对本国货币供应的影响，以防货币和信贷的正常扩张、经济过热、通胀以及外部竞争力丧失。 wai hui chu bei de gui mo biao ming le yi ge xian er yi jian de shi shi zhe xie guo jia ju jue shi hang hu duo wai bu jing ji xue jia jian yi de zi you fu dong hui lv zhi du ta men fan er xuan ze ya di ben guo hui lv zhe ji er dao zhi le jing chang zhang hu ying yu bao chi zhe zhong ying yu xu yao ben guo chu xu chi xu gao yu guo nei tou zi zhe xie guo jia cai yong de shou duan jiu shi chong xiao wai hui chu bei lei ji dui ben guo huo bi gong ying de ying xiang yi fang huo bi he xin dai de zheng chang kuo zhang jing ji guo re tong zhang yi ji wai bu jing zheng li sang shi if a substantial part of the world economy is generating huge if a substantial part of the world economy is generating huge current account surpluses, somebody else has to run offsetting current account surpluses, somebody else has to run offsetting deficits. that conclusion became still more potent when oil prices deficits. that conclusion became still more potent when oil prices soared, since this shifted income to countries that painful soared, since this shifted income to countries that painful experience has taught not to spend their additional revenue experience has taught not to spend their additional revenue quickly. in a world of fluctuating currencies, however, quickly. in a world of fluctuating currencies, however, accumulating large quantities of net foreign liabilities is easiest accumulating large quantities of net foreign liabilities is easiest for countries able to borrow freely in their own currencies. the for countries able to borrow freely in their own currencies. the reason is simple: only such countries can borrow without risking reason is simple: only such countries can borrow without risking significant currency mismatches inside their financial systems. it significant currency mismatches inside their financial systems. it is no accident then that the us has emerged as the world's chief is no accident then that the us has emerged as the world's chief deficit country - its "borrower of last resort". it alone is able deficit country - its "borrower of last resort". it alone is able to be a vast net borrower without risking the health of its to be a vast net borrower without risking the health of its financial system. financial system. 如果全球经济的一个重要区域正在产生巨额经常账户盈余，那么其它地区一定出现等额的赤字。在油价飙升之际，这一结论变得更有说服力。因为油价飙升导致收入转移到了那些有过痛苦经历的国家——这些国家已吸取教训，不再迅速消耗其额外收入。然而，在一个汇率不断波动的世界里，那些能够用本币自由借贷的国家最容易累积大量净外债。原因很简单：只有这些国家可以大量借贷，且不会造成金融体系内部出现严重的汇率失调。因此，美国成为全球第一赤字大国，就毫不奇怪了。它是作为最后手段的借款人。只有美国能够成为一个巨大的净债务国，而不会危及其本国金融体系的健康。 ru guo quan qiu jing ji de yi ge zhong yao qu yu zheng zai chan sheng ju e jing chang zhang hu ying yu na me qi ta di qu yi ding chu xian deng e de chi zi zai you jia biao sheng zhi ji zhe yi jie lun bian de geng you shuo fu li yin wei you jia biao sheng dao zhi shou ru zhuan yi dao le na xie you guo tong ku jing li de guo jia zhe xie guo jia yi xi qu jiao xun bu zai xun su xiao hao qi e wai shou ru ran er zai yi ge hui lv bu duan bo dong de shi jie li na xie neng gou yong ben bi zi you jie dai de guo jia zui rong yi lei ji da liang jing wai zhai yuan yin hen jian dan zhi you zhe xie guo jia ke yi da liang jie dai qie bu hui zao cheng jin rong ti xi nei bu chu xian yan zhong de hui lv shi diao yin ci mei guo cheng wei quan qiu di yi chi zi da guo jiu hao bu qi guai le ta shi zuo wei zui hou shou duan de jie kuan ren zhi you mei guo neng gou cheng wei yi ge ju da de jing zhai wu guo er bu hui wei ji qi ben guo jin rong ti xi de jian kang so is what some economists have called "bretton woods two" - a so is what some economists have called "bretton woods two" - a fixed exchange rate system anchored on the us dollar - both the fixed exchange rate system anchored on the us dollar - both the answer to financial instability in emerging market economies and a answer to financial instability in emerging market economies and a basis for sustainable export-led growth? basis for sustainable export-led growth? 那么，一些经济学家所谓的“新布雷顿森体体系”（bretton woods na me yi xie jing ji xue jia suo wei de xin bu lei dun sen ti ti xi bretton woods two，一种盯住美元的固定汇率制度）能否化解新兴市场经济体的金融不稳定，并成为可持续的出口主导型增长的基石呢？ two yi zhong ding zhu mei yuan de gu ding hui lv zhi du neng fou hua jie xin xing shi chang jing ji ti de jin rong bu wen ding bing cheng wei ke chi xu de chu kou zhu dao xing zeng chang de ji shi ne mr roubini argues that it is not. the policy generates mr roubini argues that it is not. the policy generates ultimately unsterilisable increases in foreign currency reserves. ultimately unsterilisable increases in foreign currency reserves. this causes excess monetary growth, domestic asset price bubbles, this causes excess monetary growth, domestic asset price bubbles, overheating, inflation and the loss in competitiveness that overheating, inflation and the loss in competitiveness that governments had tried to prevent by suppressing the rises in governments had tried to prevent by suppressing the rises in nominal exchange rates. it distorts domestic financial systems, by nominal exchange rates. it distorts domestic financial systems, by pushing interest rates below equilibrium levels. it generates a pushing interest rates below equilibrium levels. it generates a waste of resources in accumulation of low-yielding foreign currency waste of resources in accumulation of low-yielding foreign currency assets exposed to the likelihood of huge capital losses. it makes assets exposed to the likelihood of huge capital losses. it makes asian economies excessively dependent on demand from outside the asian economies excessively dependent on demand from outside the region. it exacerbates us protectionism. finally, it compelsus region. it exacerbates us protectionism. finally, it compelsus monetary authorities to sustain easy monetary policy, in order to monetary authorities to sustain easy monetary policy, in order to offset the leakage from domestic demand caused by the huge current offset the leakage from domestic demand caused by the huge current account deficits. account deficits. 鲁比尼的回答是否定的。这种政策将导致外汇储备增加，最终达到难以冲销的水平。这将导致货币供应增长过快、国内资产价格泡沫、经济过热、通胀和竞争力丧失——而这些国家的政府本来压制名义汇率的上升，就是为了防范这些问题。通过将利率维持在均衡水准以下，这种政策将会扭曲国内金融体系。低收益率外汇资产的累积可能会导致巨额资本损失，造成资源的浪费。这种政策会令亚洲经济体过度依赖于外部需求。这将导致美国的保护主义加剧。它最终会迫使美国货币当局保持宽松的货币政策，以抵消巨额经常账户赤字所导致的国内需求减少。 lu bi ni de hui da shi fou ding de zhe zhong zheng ce jiang dao zhi wai hui chu bei zeng jia zui zhong da dao nan yi chong xiao de shui ping zhe jiang dao zhi huo bi gong ying zeng chang guo kuai guo nei zi chan jia ge pao mo jing ji guo re tong zhang he jing zheng li sang shi er zhe xie guo jia de zheng fu ben lai ya zhi ming yi hui lv de shang sheng jiu shi wei le fang fan zhe xie wen ti tong guo jiang li lv wei chi zai jun heng shui zhun yi xia zhe zhong zheng ce jiang hui niu qu guo nei jin rong ti xi di shou yi lv wai hui zi chan de lei ji ke neng hui dao zhi ju e zi ben sun shi zao cheng zi yuan de lang fei zhe zhong zheng ce hui ling ya zhou jing ji ti guo du yi lai yu wai bu xu qiu zhe jiang dao zhi mei guo de bao hu zhu yi jia ju ta zui zhong hui po shi mei guo huo bi dang ju bao chi kuan song de huo bi zheng ce yi di xiao ju e jing chang zhang hu chi zi suo dao zhi de guo nei xu qiu jian shao the post-crisis policy system has proved more durable than many the post-crisis policy system has proved more durable than many (including myself) expected. at its heart, however, is china. (including myself) expected. at its heart, however, is china. though not affected directly by the crisis, it was one of the though not affected directly by the crisis, it was one of the countries that learnt its lessons in the asian way. today's result countries that learnt its lessons in the asian way. today's result is a dynamic behemoth accumulating foreign currency reserves at a is a dynamic behemoth accumulating foreign currency reserves at a rate of $50bn a month in the first quarter of the year and expected rate of $50bn a month in the first quarter of the year and expected by the imf to generate a current account surplus of 10 per cent of by the imf to generate a current account surplus of 10 per cent of gross domestic product this year.i do not believe these astonishing gross domestic product this year.i do not believe these astonishing trends are desirable or sustainable. why that is so and what to do trends are desirable or sustainable. why that is so and what to do about it i intend to discuss next week. about it i intend to discuss next week. 事实证明，亚洲金融危机之后的政策体系比许多人（包括我自己）预期的要稳固。但问题的关键是中国。尽管中国没有直接受到亚洲金融危机的影响，但它也是用这种亚洲方式吸取教训的国家之一。如今站在世人面前的是一个充满活力的庞然大物。今年第一季度，中国的外汇储备平均每月增长500亿美元，而imf预测，中国经常账户盈余占国内生产总值(gdp)的比例今年将达到10%。我认为，这些惊人的趋势既不理想也不可持续。我将在下周讨论其原因和应对措施。 shi shi zheng ming ya zhou jin rong wei ji zhi hou de zheng ce ti xi bi hu duo ren bao kuo wo zi ji yu qi de yao wen gu dan wen ti de guan jian shi zhong guo jin guan zhong guo mei you zhi jie shou dao ya zhou jin rong wei ji de ying xiang dan ta ye shi yong zhe zhong ya zhou fang shi xi qu jiao xun de guo jia zhi yi ru jin zhan zai shi ren mian qian de shi yi ge chong man huo li de pang ran da wu jin nian di yi ji du zhong guo de wai hui chu bei ping jun mei yue zeng chang 500 yi mei yuan er imf yu ce zhong guo jing chang zhang hu ying yu zhan guo nei sheng chan zong zhi (gdp) de bi li jin nian jiang da dao 10% wo ren wei zhe xie jing ren de qu shi ji bu li xiang ye bu ke chi xu wo jiang zai xia zhou tao lun qi yuan yin he ying dui cuo shi *亚洲正从1997至1998年的金融危机中吸取错误的教训（asia is * ya zhou zheng cong 1997 zhi 1998 nian de jin rong wei ji zhong xi qu cuo wu de jiao xun asia is learning the wrong lessons from its 1997-98 financial learning the wrong lessons from its 1997-98 financial crisis），www.rgemonitor.com/ crisis www.rgemonitor.com/ asians图影城